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One type of ﬁ  nancial reform being proposed to deal with the aftermath of the housing crisis is allowing bankruptcy 
judges the authority to modify residential mortgages in a way referred to as a stripdown. The reform is seen by some as 
a partial solution to the rise in foreclosures and as a Pandora’s box by others. But the debate is not new one. The 1980s 
farm foreclosure crisis sparked similar proposals and concerns. Congress decided to enact legislation that contained a 
stripdown provision, resulting in the creation of Chapter 12 in the bankruptcy code. The effects of Chapter 12 stripdown 
authority after its enactment shed light on the efﬁ  cacy of granting bankruptcy judges similar authority for housing loans. 
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The real estate boom and bust of the past decade have pro-
duced the biggest housing ﬁ  nance calamity since the Great 
Depression. Four years after the onset of the foreclosure 
crisis, mortgage default and foreclosure rates remain near 
historic levels. Distress in the housing sector has persisted 
despite a cavalcade of proposals and programs aimed at 
stemming the tide of foreclosures.
Among these proposals is one to revise Chapter 13 of the 
bankruptcy code to allow judges to modify mortgages on pri-
mary residences. The type of loan modiﬁ  cation under con-
sideration is known as a loan cramdown or loan stripdown 
because the judge would reduce the balance of the secured 
claim to the current market value of the house, turning the 
remaining balance of the mortgage into an unsecured claim 
(which would receive the same proportionate payout as other 
unsecured debts included in the bankruptcy petition).
Naturally, any proposal that promises to change the rights 
of creditors or borrowers is likely to engender a lively, 
sometimes ﬁ  erce debate. Bankruptcy stripdowns of mort-
gages secured by primary residences are no exception.
Many proponents of this reform see it as a partial solu-
tion to the foreclosure crisis, arguing that it will reduce the 
number of homes going into foreclosure by increasing the 
number of sustainable loan modiﬁ  cations. Some advocates 
do not see it as the magic bullet for the foreclosure crisis, 
but rather base their case on equity grounds. They point 
out that just about every other type of secured loan can be 
stripped down in Chapter 13, including mortgages on rental 
properties and vacation homes.
Opponents of the reform have advanced several reasons 
for continuing to prevent stripdowns of primary residences 
in bankruptcy. One of the most commonly mentioned is 
the possibility that stripdowns would lead to an increase in 
mortgage interest rates. They argue that an unintended con-
sequence of mortgage loan modiﬁ  cations under Chapter 13 
might be to make homeownership less affordable and, more 
importantly, less accessible to low- and moderate-income 
families.
Opponents also fear that making this change to the bank-
ruptcy code during the current ﬁ  nancial crisis could prompt 
an avalanche of Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions, which 
could overwhelm the courts.
Finally, many banks and other lenders have expressed con-
cern that allowing bankruptcy stripdowns would shift losses 
from borrowers to lenders and give bankruptcy judges too 
much discretion when rewriting the terms of the debt. Any 
such loss shifting raises issues of fairness with respect to this 
reform, as it would be changing the rules governing primary 
residence loans after the terms had been established and 
agreed upon.
The debate on the impact of bankruptcy stripdowns on 
the cost and availability of mortgage credit is hampered 
by a lack of empirical evidence—reﬂ  ecting in large part the 
scarcity of available data. The limited empirical evidence 
on Chapter 13 stripdowns of primary mortgages does not 
support the concerns of opponents (see for example, a recent 
study by Adam Levitin and Joshua Goodman). However, as 
with any single empirical study, one must be cautious about 
overinterpreting their results (see, for example, the response 
by Mark Scarberry).The increase in farm land values was accompanied by an in-
crease in agricultural debt loads, as many farmers borrowed 
to acquire additional acreage (see ﬁ  gure 2). Because they 
lacked the needed cash and because they expected increased 
cash ﬂ  ows, many farmers used variable-rate notes to pur-
chase real estate. Farm loan underwriting standards eased, 
and a speculative lending boom ensued. Lenders began to 
rely less heavily on the ability of borrowers to service their 
debt from operating cash ﬂ  ows and more on the continued 
appreciation of the underlying collateral—the farm land—for 
repayment. But when demand for farm goods began to fall, 
farm real estate prices also fell precipitously. As farms’ cash 
ﬂ  ows decreased and the variable-rate notes used to purchase 
farm real estate reset, many farmers saw their interest rates 
increase and found that they could not make payments and 
were underwater on their mortgages.
Farmland values peaked in 1981 in the Midwest, where the 
land-price appreciation had been the greatest, and declined 
by as much as 49 percent over the next few years before 
bottoming out in 1987. Farm-sector debt quadrupled from 
the early 1970s through the mid-1980s. Debt declined by 
one-third from 1984 through 1987, but much of this reduc-
tion reﬂ  ected the liquidation of farms.
As with homeowners in the recent foreclosure crisis, many 
farmers—especially those in the Midwest and Southwest, 
the heart of the farm land bubble–were faced with loans 
whose face value exceeded the current market value of the 
real estate serving as collateral for the loan. Many farmers, 
like many homeowners now, were in danger of losing their 
primary residences, with little prospect of relief under the 
bankruptcy options available to farmers at that time. As is 
the case today, Chapter 13 did not allow for the modiﬁ  ca-
tion of debt secured by a primary residence. Chapter 11 
involved more complexity than a family farm reorganization 
required, making it difﬁ  cult to navigate. It also contained 
provisions that allowed creditors to effectively block a strip-
down: undersecured creditors could elect to treat their entire 
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This is not the ﬁ  rst time policymakers have questioned 
whether bankruptcy judges should be allowed to do strip-
downs of debt secured by a primary residence. In the 1980s, 
Congress responded to the farm foreclosure crisis with 
legislation that contained a stripdown provision—and it re-
sulted in the creation of Chapter 12 in the bankruptcy code. 
Although the farm foreclosure crisis and the current foreclo-
sure crisis differ in many respects, the response to the farm 
foreclosure crisis is still informative. After all, many of the 
claims and concerns expressed in the current debate were 
central in the debate over Chapter 12. The effects of Chapter 
12 stripdown authority after its enactment can shed light on 
the efﬁ  cacy of allowing bankruptcy judges similar authority 
under Chapter 13. To that end, this Economic Commentary looks 
back at the 1980s’ farm lending crisis, the debate surrounding 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy, and the lessons to be learned for the 
current debate on Chapter 13 stripdowns.
The Agricultural Lending Crisis
The agricultural lending crisis of the early 1980s had its 
roots in the agricultural export boom of the 1970s. U.S. 
agricultural exports rose over 500 percent from 1972 to 
1981 (from $8.24 to $43.78 billion), which in turn led to a 
dramatic rise in commodity prices and farm incomes over 
the time period. Net farm income peaked at over $27 billion 
in 1979, a rise of 41 percent over the decade (see ﬁ  gure 1).
The 1980s farming crisis was a typical boom–bust scenario: 
Demand for farming goods increased sharply during the 
early 1970s but saw a corresponding decline in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. When prices for their goods were 
rising, farms expanded and farm real estate prices increased 
signiﬁ  cantly. Iowa, a bellwether state in terms of farm prices 
in the corn belt, saw the average price of an acre more than 
quadruple from 1970 to its peak in 1982, only to lose nearly 
two-thirds of its value over the next ﬁ  ve years. Over the 
same time period, the average price of farmland nationally 
also rose rapidly, increasing more than 350 percent by 1982, 
before falling by more than a third by 1987.claim as a secured claim, for which they would receive deferred 
cash payments that totaled the amount of the debt and had a 
minimum present value equal to the value of the collateral.
Moratoriums on foreclosures in a number of farm states 
slowed the rising tide of farm foreclosures somewhat, but 
they provided only a temporary reprieve as the fundamental 
economic factors of lower land values and lower crop prices 
relative to the 1970s left many farmers unable to service 
their existing debt and with almost no possibility of renego-
tiating their secured loans with creditors.
Unlike the home foreclosure crisis, the overhang of troubled 
farm debt was highly concentrated, sitting on the books of 
the Farm Credit Banks, Farmer Mac, and commercial banks 
in the affected regions. Failures of agricultural banks acceler-
ated in the early to mid-1980s, accounting for a third of all 
bank failures from 1984 to 1987.
The Coming of Chapter 12 Bankruptcy
Once the farm foreclosure crisis hit, existing provisions in 
the bankruptcy code proved inadequate for reorganizing 
small-to-medium sized family farms. While farmers seeking 
to reorganize could, in principle, choose to ﬁ  le under Chap-
ter 13 (personal bankruptcy) or Chapter 11, the average farmer 
typically exceeded the debt limits for ﬁ  ling under chapter 13. 
Unfortunately, Chapter 11 was for inappropriate for most of 
these farmers as well, being a cumbersome and overly complex 
option, since it is designed to deal with the reorganization of 
corporations and not small and medium-sized farms.
After much deliberation (some version of the legislation had 
been under consideration and debate for nearly two-and-a-
half years) Congress passed the Bankruptcy Judges, United 
States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. 
This legislation established a separate chapter in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 12, for farmers deﬁ  ned by the 
act as family farmers (for the deﬁ  nition, see the summary of 
Chapter 12 by Phillip L. Kunkel, Jeffrey A. Peterson and Jessi-
ca A. Mitchell in the recommended readings). The legislation 
included a sunset provision allowing the study of the impact 
of Chapter 12 before it would be made permanent. Chapter 
12 was extended twice before becoming permanent in 2005.
What is interesting about the creation of Chapter 12 for the 
current debate on allowing stripdowns of debt secured by 
a primary residence is that the Congress responded to the 
farm foreclosure crisis of the 1980s with legislation that con-
tained a stripdown provision. Stripdowns were permitted for 
farmers because voluntary modiﬁ  cation efforts, even when 
subsidized by the government, did not lead agricultural 
lenders to negotiate loan modiﬁ  cations. At the time, oppo-
nents of stripdowns made the same arguments people are 
raising today: Allowing stripdowns would ﬂ  ood bankruptcy 
courts, permit abuse by borrowers who could afford to pay 
their loans, and reduce the availability of credit, among 
other things.
The actual negative impact of the farm stripdown legislation 
was minor. Although the legislation created a special chapter 
in the Bankruptcy Code for farmers and allowed stripdowns 
on primary residences, it did not change the cost and avail-
ability of farm credit dramatically. In fact, a United States 
General Accounting Ofﬁ  ce (1989) survey of a small group 
of bankers found that none of them raised interest rates to 
farmers more than 50 basis points. While this rate change 
may have been a response to the Chapter 12, it is also 
consistent with increasing premiums due to the economic 
environment. This suggests that the changes in the cost 
and availability of farm credit after the bankruptcy reform 
differed little from what would be expected in that economic 
environment, absent reform.
What was most interesting about Chapter 12 is that it 
worked without working. According to studies by Robert 
Collender (1993) and Jerome Stam and Bruce Dixon (2004), 
instead of ﬂ  ooding bankruptcy courts, Chapter 12 drove the 
parties to make private loan modiﬁ  cations. In fact, although 
the U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁ  ce reports that more than 
30,000 bankruptcy ﬁ  lings were expected the year Chapter 
12 went into effect, only 8,500 were ﬁ  led in the ﬁ  rst two 
years. Since then, Chapter 12 bankruptcy ﬁ  lings have con-
tinued to fall.
Conclusion
Allowing bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages secured 
by primary residences remains one of the most contentious 
proposed responses to the ongoing home mortgage fore-
closure crisis. After all, any legislative reform that allows 
bankruptcy judges to strip down debt secured by primary 
residences can potentially alter the terms of ﬁ  nancial con-
tracts, a change that could have unintended consequences.
The debate is not a new one. The 1980s farm foreclosure 
crisis sparked similar proposals and concerns. Congress’s 
response was to include a stripdown provision in a newly 
created chapter in the bankruptcy code speciﬁ  cally intended 
for family farms. The effects of that stripdown provision, 
in place for more than two decades, on the availability and 
terms of agricultural credit suggest that there has been little 
if any economically signiﬁ  cant impact on the cost and avail-
ability of that credit.
In applying the lessons of Chapter 12 reform to the current 
debate one needs to recognize some important differences 
between the agricultural foreclosure crisis of the 1980s and 
the current home foreclosure crisis. First, the structure of 
the underlying loan markets is different. Unlike mortgages 
today, few if any of the farm loans in the 1980s were sold 
or securitized. Moreover, there was more direct government 
involvement in agricultural loan markets in the 1980s than 
there was in the mortgage markets leading up to the current 
housing crisis. Finally, the scale of the current foreclosure 
crisis is several times larger than the 1980s agricultural 
crisis, which was limited geographically to the Midwest 
and Great Plains states. Yet, despite these differences, the 
response to the farm foreclosure crisis and the impact of 
bankruptcy reform on agricultural credit markets is still 
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